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Proponents of open education frequently position it as a radical alternative to 
existing forms of education. Whether discussed in terms of open access to 
educational materials “enabling universal education” (Caswell, Henson, Jensen, & 
Wiley, 2008), the possibility that Google searching will end “the monopoly (or at 
least hegemony)” lecturers and university libraries once embodied (Barber, 
Donnelly, & Rizvi, 2013, p. 16), or the proposal that MOOCs will replace the need to 
study for a programme at a ‘brick and mortar’ campus with a pick and mix selection 
of “the best online courses from the best professors around the world” (Friedman, 
2013), the proposal is that new forms of openness are poised to transform 
education, sweeping away the constraints of physical sites of learning and solving 
the problems of educational access for good.  
This is hardly a new proposal. As Peter and Deimann (2013) chronicled, 
sociotechnical developments that affect the ‘openness’ of education can be traced 
back to the 12th century. However, the effects of such developments are complex, 
not simply accumulative, and certainly not a deterministic outcome of technological 
development. Instead, openness is “not only a technological, but also a social, 
cultural and economic phenomenon, not bound by institutional or national 
boundaries. [This shows] the danger of emphasising one aspect of openness while 
backgrounding others and how unrestricted practices can quickly, and repeatedly, 
become institutionalized” (Peter & Deimann, 2013, pp. 11–12). 
Yet as Peter and Deimann (2013) noted , contemporary discussions of openness 
seem strangely detached from the past, seeing it instead as a novelty, a new moment 
in education. Lacking historical context, the development of new technologies may 
indeed seem to offer a brighter educational future. However, work within the field of 
educational technology has long been recognized as being caught in cycles of hope, 
hype and disappointment because it fails to engage adequately with theoretical or 
historical critique (Mayes, 1995). There is every risk that recent work on open 
education could repeat this pattern.  
At its best, the current hope for openness addresses itself to some of the most 
pressing political challenges facing education today. Laurillard (2008), for example, 
focused on the worldwide demand for an estimated additional 125 million higher 
education places by 2020. Her proposals seek ways “to extend education well 
beyond the confines of the physical” (p. 321), and ideally, to do so in ways that scale 
beyond staff to student ratios of 1:30, which even open education programmes have 
struggled to do. In the last few years, the newspapers would have us believe that 
massive open online courses (MOOCs) have done exactly that (Lewin, 2012), 
opening up higher education to over 100,000 students on some early course 
offerings. Advocates go so far as to claim that the battle for openness has been won 
and that openness has already become fundamental to higher education (Weller, 
2014). 
The promise in such proposals is one of universal access—but access to what? What 
kind of education is envisioned in these accounts? Knox’s (2013) discussion of the 
open educational resources movement noted that universities are described as 
having functions such as content development, research and credentialing, but 
teaching methods or teacherly expertise appear to have been dismissed. Weller 
(2014, pp. 9–12) talked about teachers being relevant when knowledge is scarce but 
proposed pedagogies of abundance (focused on using abundant online content) and 
of openness (adding learner networking); “campus classroom based didactic 
learning pedagogies” (p. 10) are dismissed, wholesale. This account has much to say 
about connections between learners, and about the generation of more material, but 
nothing about the value of what is produced or how learners make sense of the 
abundance they encounter; it addresses provision and access but not the 
responsibilities that go alongside this. In Ross, Sinclair, Knox, Bayne, and Macleod’s 
(2014) analysis of writing about MOOCs, they argued that peculiarly circumscribed 
accounts of teachers’ roles dominate the discussion. Typically, these are 
characterised purely in terms of the teacher “having expert knowledge, but lacking 
the means to widely transmit it” (p. 59). Downes (2011), for example, was quite 
explicit about this—and about its economic foundations. 
Technology gives us access to new markets. Before the internet, and I 
remember these days, my power of communication extended to the 
room that I was in, maybe a bit further if I shouted, and I did shout from 
time to time because I wanted to be heard, and that’s it. But today, with 
the various technologies, I have a global reach. I have a global reach not 
just in terms of distance, I have a global reach in terms of audience. I can 
reach out beyond my own community, my own group. This is a capacity I 
never had. (p. 38) 
Such writing produces oversimplified views of education—for example, that it is the 
technologically mediated equivalent of shouting and that Downes’s voice can now 
be heard to the ends of the earth. Consequently, subsequent analysis has resulted in 
overexaggerated claims for the disruptive potential of MOOCs. This is, arguably, a 
classic example of Heideggerian enframing: Any aspect of education beyond the 
need to access information vanishes, leaving only a standing reserve of information 
resources (which, potentially, includes teachers) waiting to be served up to needy 
learners. 
There are some variations in the scope of such discussions: Writing about cMOOCs, 
which draw on Connectivist accounts of learning, do draw in slightly different kinds 
of reserve. In these accounts, cMOOCs are claimed to be “an open and a-hierarchical 
invitation to participate in and scaffold activities and discussions: a true ‘teacher as 
learner as teacher’ model” (McAuley, Stewart, Siemens, & Cormier, 2010, p. 11). In 
contrast to xMOOCs, fellow participants are foregrounded for their potential in 
supporting learning; however, the distinctive responsibilities of teachers to plan, 
coordinate, provide feedback and assess are effaced. 
In both these kinds of account, the peculiar enframing of ‘education’ reduces the 
account to a matter of information flow. Teaching, as an active, purposeful process, 
vanishes from the picture, which focuses exclusively and unhelpfully on the learner; 
it is an example of the ‘learnification’ of education (Biesta, 2012). Downes (2011, p. 
36) was explicit about this, proposing that “the old way is centered around the 
institution—government, corporation, Microsoft, broadcasting agency, AOL–Time 
Network—the new way is centered around the individual—the personal website, 
the blog, the email address.” In such accounts, the complexities of educational power 
are positioned as inherently problematic; they are inherently immoral—rather than 
historical, perhaps inevitable, maybe even beneficial. They are there to be done 
away with and certainly not to be explored and understood, as has happened in 
other areas of research (Ross et al., 2014).  
This view of learners as nodes in an information network, sending and receiving 
information, accords closely with the principles and metaphors that have influenced 
the design of the Internet and the protocols on which it operates (Friesen, 2010). 
The development of the Internet has been strongly influenced by funding and 
projects from the U.S. military, who needed to create distributed networks that 
would support communication after a nuclear strike. Ironically, given the centrality 
of the Internet in the open education movement, the view on which this network 
was developed was one in which humans were treated as a ‘processing device,’ 
acting between a machine’s display and controls. An important design ideal was to 
create closed systems, with cybernetic loops improving efficiency through 
individual feedback—an ideal reminiscent of discussions of personalized learning to 
this day. 
Also ironic, given the stand taken against the power of teachers, is that such 
discourses are commonly associated with strongly politicized views of the purpose 
of education. Atkins et al. (2007), for example, discussed “free access to high-quality 
content to be used by colleges and individuals in the United States and throughout 
the world to increase human capital” (p. 2). The neoliberal rationale and the 
geographic bias are plain; as with earlier discussions of flexibility (e.g., Edwards, 
1997), learners are compelled to participate or else risk becoming obsolete, 
unemployable—and thus of no value. Such framing of open access is not universal, 
of course; for example, Mackie (2008, p. 126) cautioned against exactly this, and 
Downes (2011) took delight in his anarchic position. However, it serves as a 
reminder that freedom of access can form part of a wider social project, one in 
which the freedom not to access resources slips away. 
A particular problem, according to these accounts, is providing access to 
infrastructure, and particularly to campuses, libraries and so on (e.g., Lane, 2008; 
Taylor, 2007). Lane (2008, p. 150), for example, associated the campus with 
‘closure,’ describing using terms such as traditional, boundary, limit, selection, 
schedule and so on, and stated bluntly that “students must come to the campus to 
participate in the educational experience”—although he did admit that this 
portrayal is a “stereotype” (p. 151). Opening access, therefore, is something to be 
achieved by removing all such restrictions. Technology is the means to achieve this, 
resulting in a push toward digitization, a focus on access to courseware and above 
all a denial of the situatedness of studying. 
Knox (2013) argued that such positions focus on dismantling hierarchies of control 
and bypassing the conditions around admittance to knowledge, but they fail to 
explore what the value of this is to learners. Knox drew on Berlin’s differentiation of 
freedom into positive liberty (where individuals choose the form and quality of 
freedom they wish to pursue and how to pursue it) and negative liberty 
(emphasising the removal of barriers to freedom), characterised as freedom to and 
freedom from. From this perspective, it becomes clear that these types of accounts 
focus on forms of negative liberty, shedding ‘unfreedoms’; in so doing, they draw 
attention only to barriers and consequently position institutions as restrictive, 
exclusionary and self-interested. Moreover, Knox pointed out that an idealistic 
pursuit of negative liberty would lead to unrestrained action, not to coherent, 
organised outcomes directly comparable with, or in some enthusiastic accounts 
even surpassing, those of formal educational systems. 
Instead, Knox proposed that adopting a critical theory of the subject would be a 
more appropriate way to understand open education. This would allow a more 
nuanced discussion of operations of power, one that acknowledges its inevitable 
links to claims about knowledge. It would also allow the development of a more 
coherent account of subjective agency, one able to bring together the purposeful 
pursuit of individual freedoms with a recognition of how power, through structures, 
disciplines, organisations and environments, contributes to the formation of 
subjectivities. This requires moving on from idealised, humanist accounts of rational 
individual agency and recognition that construction of the self is not a purely 
discursive process and is certainly more than a by-product of the types of 
educational resources an individual chooses to consume. 
One important marker of this issue is the absence of discussions of embodiment or 
situation in work advocating online forms of open education. The participation of 
learners is curiously rarified. As Dall’Alba and Barnacle argued (2005), the 
conventional design of programmes involves imparting knowledge and skills in a 
way that is decontextualized from the practices to which they belong, a problem that 
they trace back to Cartesian dualism. They proposed countering this 
phenomenologically, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embodied knowing and 
the extension into and unison with other bodies, entities and things that comprise 
the world.  
This move draws attention to what Land (2005) described as the “incorporeal 
fallacy” of online learning: the apparent dissipation of human bodies from 
discussion or consideration. Reacting against this, Land observed that “cyberspace 
could well be a non-space, but the subjects who inhabit it always remain embodied” 
(p. 154). Granted, sociotechnical developments can imply “a new, different, and 
complex way of experiencing the relationship between the physical human body 
and the ‘I’ that inhabits it” (Stone, 1991, p. 86). But, as Stone (1991) argued, 
although we may have learnt to delegate agency to body-representatives that exist 
in an imaginary space, and while there may have been a trend toward 
understanding the body as physical and the subject as textual, the body still 
remains.  
Dreyfus (2008) argued that this raises questions for all forms of online education, 
proposing that “Internet user’s disembodiment has profound and unexpected 
effects” and may undermine the credibility of the endeavour (p. 3). He is perhaps 
premature in celebrating the force of his arguments, particularly given subsequent 
developments with MOOCs: 
Most of Chapter Two predicting the failure of disembodied distance 
learning and ridiculing the enthusiasts who predicted that, thanks to the 
Internet, an Ivy League education would be available to everyone on the 
planet and that Universities as we know them would disappear had to be 
scrapped. It is now clear that distance learning has failed. The major 
universities have given up on it and consider their investments of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars sunk costs. (p. xi) 
However, it is hard to shake off such concerns, not least because MOOCs have failed 
to provide the ‘avalanche’ or revolution higher education was promised; the 
enthusiasts have not been fully vindicated, either.  
An important consideration in Dreyfus’s (2008) arguments is what he meant by 
‘disembodied.’ Obviously, he is not proposing the literal absence of the material 
body; he directly challenges the enthusiasts who aspire to “sloughing off our 
situated bodies” (p. 50). Instead, as he elaborated, his concern is more with whether 
“the mediated information concerning distant objects and people transmitted to us 
over the Internet as telepresence would be as present as anything could get” (p. 54). 
As an example, he pointed to things like the Mars Sojourner, where the perceptual 
delays that follow from controlling it emphasise our lack of direct presence.  
However, whilst delays in response to control signals may make an operator acutely 
aware of not being present with the Mars Rover, they probably neither expect nor 
want a faithful experience of being present on the surface of Mars. Instead, what 
they have is a sense of presence in the control room of a scientific mission, using a 
distributed network of scientific tools that include the experimental apparatus of 
the rover; and this experience of doing scientific work is direct, risky and 
meaningful in its own right. Even where specialist technology mediates our 
experience of the object of study, we may still have available to us a direct 
experience of what it means to study such an object. 
The reason this matters is because of student expectations. A student studying 
online and expecting to experience the same kind of conversation he or she would 
have in a one-to-one tutorial or a group workshop may well find the mediation of 
discussions inimical to a sense of presence. However, students expecting to study in 
isolation, primarily reading texts on screen, may find the experience of chatting to 
fellow students live on an audio conferencing tool such as Skype, or engaging in 
complex, closely argued exchanges with their peers in an online discussion forum, 
far more sociable than they were expecting. If the online exchange is understood as 
a proxy for the classroom, it will fall short of that benchmark. But if a different 
benchmark is chosen—specifically, if such online interactions form an expected part 
of what it means to study, which, for a growing (but not universal) group of people 
is exactly what they expect (Jones & Healing, 2010)—then this itself is the direct 
experience that they were looking for. 
To elaborate this point, we can draw on Heidegger’s distinction between tools that 
are ready-to-hand and those that are present-at-hand. Tools that are ready-to-hand 
form part of a network of things and practices, and we use them without having to 
focus on them to achieve meaningful ends. By contrast, we are aware of those that 
are present-at-hand—perhaps because they are unfamiliar or broken, or they are 
hindering the task at hand. Making sense of them involves focusing on them, 
theorizing them, to mend, master or improve them in some way. 
For the operator of the Mars Sojourner, the difficulties of controlling the rover in the 
face of communication lag, a challenging environment and so on, all suggest that the 
rover itself might well be present-at-hand, a struggle to control and so a constant 
reminder of the way presence is mediated. However, in the control room itself, the 
keyboard and mouse being used to issue commands to the rover might be ready-to-
hand; this part of the network is familiar, not an object of focus, and even though the 
action involves complex, distributed technologies, the controller might experience 
their presence in the control room as immediate. 
To echo this point within an educational context, if an online student tries to use a 
bulletin board to recreate the experience of chatting about a concept, or an 
experiment, or a research paper, with one of his or her peers, that student might 
well find that the use of a virtual learning environment obscures the intended 
discussion. The student’s sense of presence will feel mediated. However, a student 
caught up in writing an essay, using alt-tab to swap between Microsoft Word and 
Google Scholar while searching for journal articles to support his or her argument, 
might well experience a kind of flow state, one in which the student is so focused on 
the task that he or she is not directly aware of the fluency with which these tools are 
used. What the student is focused on is writing.  
Writing is, and always has been, a technologically mediated activity—a point that 
can be traced back to Plato’s accounts of Socrates’s dialogue with Phaedrus. Law 
(1992) elaborated the networks that writing as communication involves, for 
example—such as the computer keyboard, the computer, paper, printing presses, 
the postal system and so on. However, although writing—a central part of almost 
every educational experience—is always mediated, it seems inappropriate to 
condemn all writing as ‘disembodied’ experience. 
What this suggests, then, is the important issue is not the pursuit of an unmediated 
embodiment but a question of using appropriate technologies to engage with the 
world. Dall’Alba and Barnacle (2005) developed this point in relation to online 
learning, drawing on Ihde’s work to argue that our embodiment is transformed 
through the extension of the body by sophisticated modern technologies, including 
the Internet. Adopting such a relational perspective supports a more complex 
account of the role of technology. 
So while the word processor does indeed transform writing practices, 
the transformation is not simply an imposition. Rather, the 
transformation occurs through the mediated relation between “user” and 
machine, where the parameters and potentials of both are transformed 
(although not necessarily symmetrically) . . . . The impact of technologies, 
therefore, is neither singular nor predictable as their performance also 
reconstitutes our own desires and actions. (Dall’Alba & Barnacle, 2005, p. 
735) 
As a consequence, they argued, the use of the Internet to support distance learning 
does not necessarily result in disembodiment and disengagement. Instead, the 
opportunities it provides for extending the body through technologies can make 
different kinds of presence and engagement possible; they become the means of 
inquiry, from the natural sciences through to philosophy (Ihde, 2005). Perhaps 
more provocatively, where such forms of engagement are part of the hermeneutic 
process itself, confronting students with unfamiliar technologies, with things that 
leave them feeling disembodied, which are experienced as present-at-hand, may be 
a productive thing to do, precisely because it requires them to theorize the 
technology and to make sense of it as part of specific kinds of being-in-the-world. 
Adopting this stance on the relationships between tools and knowledge draws 
attention back to the specific situations in which learners find themselves and how 
these play into the success or failure of their studies, requiring us to explain the 
materiality of social practices (Latour, 2005). Such sociomaterial analyses reveal the 
tensions between freedom from and freedom to, outlined earlier. 
The campus—or more generally, the co-location of learners, teachers, 
labs, classrooms, lecture theatres, libraries and so on—refuses to lie 
down and die . . . . Those seeking to develop distributed education should 
understand the support a campus setting gives the educational process 
and should be prepared for the necessity to find new ways of providing 
that support in a distributed education context. (Cornford & Pollock, 
2005, p. 170) 
Cornford and Pollock (2005) talked about the campus as a ‘resourceful constraint,’ 
one that does indeed create problems of geographical access but which is taken up 
repeatedly and successfully in the academic work of students and staff, day after 
day, around the world. The material campus provides what Bowker and Star (2000, 
pp. 34–35) described as an infrastructure: something that is embedded within other 
social structures; is transparent (in that it supports tasks without being noticed), at 
least once people become familiar with it; persists across time and/or space; 
develops in modular increments because it is big, layered and complex, and so on. 
Attending to the networks of people and things that students rely upon in their 
studies reveals the consistent presence of infrastructural elements. The sheer 
volume and persistence of learning practices undertaken in these conventional sites 
of study is testament to their ongoing value; however, students also study in a range 
of other settings, including their homes, parks and on public transport (Gourlay & 
Oliver, 2013). The campus tells an important part of the story but not the entirety of 
it. 
To understand how students are already moving beyond the constraints of the 
campus, it is useful to draw on a mobilities perspective. Instead of seeing spaces 
such as a container or backcloth, or from the perspective of open education as some 
kind of trap or barrier, a mobilities analysis explores how spaces are enacted and 
become sedimented across time (Edwards et al., 2011). Rather than assuming the 
function of, say, a ‘lecture theatre,’ it involves exploring how specific educational 
practices enacted in that space come to frame it in a way that is consistently 
recognizable. Following the flows of studying, as people and things move from place 
to place, it becomes possible to identify ‘open’ aspects of practices where mobility 
becomes possible (across time, space and forms of mediation), as well as aspects 
where practice has instead become tethered. Such tethering is not inherently bad—
having infrastructures ready-to-hand allows freedom to, rather than having to 
rebuild the material conditions for knowledge work at each new instance of the 
practice. Indeed, tethering is necessary: Stability across time is what gives things 
coherence, and in the case of open education, would allow us to talk about learning 
as opposed to just a series of momentary experiences. Such tethering need not be in 
the order of whole programmes of study, of course, but this does need to be 
considered. 
The imperative then becomes finding ways to mobilize infrastructure and to 
understand the specific kinds of tethering that diverse learners find problematic. It 
also requires us to appreciate the specific kinds of mobilities that diverse learners 
find problematic, since the work required to reconnect material environments to 
knowledge practices can be considerable. Students persist in the face of remarkable 
challenges, as demonstrated, for example, by the way in which students in South 
Africa persisted with online courses using cell phones, to overcome the 
infrastructural challenges of unreliable power supplies and Internet connections 
(Czerniewicz, Williams, & Brown, 2009). It is striking that, “in these difficult 
conditions, so seriously constraining in real ways, some students are able to 
overcome structural challenges which would seem to determine their actions” 
(Czerniewicz et al., 2009, p. 81). Part of the explanation of this rests on the way in 
which these individuals had tethered particular learning practices to their phone, 
allowing them to substitute this relatively reliable infrastructure as a point of 
stability and continuity in their ongoing studies, replacing other more erratic and 
unreliable infrastructures. However, it is important to note that these replacements 
were things that the students had to assemble themselves: Even where the material 
infrastructure (the phone, the cell network) was already in place, these had to be 
enrolled into the service of learning, requiring the development of new connections 
(from the phone to the virtual learning environment, the phone screen to PDFs, etc.) 
and new practices (participating via the phone in online discussions, reading 
academic papers on very small screens). New forms of openness had been achieved, 
but students paid a price in terms of the effort and cost of making studying possible. 
Conclusions 
 
The open education movement strives to achieve important moral ends, envisaging 
a more participative, inclusive form of education for the future. However, the way in 
which this is pursued is often simplistic. Considerable attention is given to the 
removal of barriers, to achieving freedom from constraints on learning. The 
question of what learners might then be free to do is less attended to. Removing 
barriers is an important part of the whole process of opening education, but it is 
only part of what is needed. 
This simplistic view is enabled by conceptions of learning that treat learners as 
nodes or components in an information system. By disregarding the complexities of 
embodied, situated experience, learning becomes a more tractable problem. If these 
complexities are brought back into the discussion, questions arise as to how 
learners can construct the complex sociomaterial networks they need to learn. It 
also highlights that learners’ experiences will be diverse, being influenced by the 
wide range of contexts that they create or find themselves in, and also that these will 
necessarily vary over time. 
One way in which the open education can respond to this is by attending to the ways 
in which specific groups manage to mobilise their learning. To be coherent, learning 
needs points of stability and continuity—these might be provided by institutions 
but can also be associated with devices, people or other spaces. Rather than vilifying 
universities, which have developed to provide incredibly successful and persistent 
sites of tethering, it might be possible to learn from these successes. Where equally 
successful points of tethering could be created that were (for example) associated 
with devices rather than spaces, this might well open education up in important 
new ways—although it must be recognized that this comes at a price, with 
geographical freedom traded off against the economic costs of acquiring and 
maintaining the device. Achieving a greater degree of openness in one arena 
requires a greater degree of closure in another. 
Arguably, then, no form of education can become completely free without losing all 
coherence and recognisability. However, it is possible and important to create a 
broader repertoire of kinds of freedom. Achieving this may help create forms of 
open education appropriate for the diverse needs of the wide array of learners that 
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